REGULATING BROILER CONTRACTS: TOURNAMENTS VERSUS FIXED PERFORMANCE STANDARDS by Tsoulouhas, Theofanis & Vukina, Tomislav
REGULATING BROILER CONTRACTS: TOURNAMENTS
 VERSUS FIXED PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
Theofanis Tsoulouhas




Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, North Carolina State University
3332 Nelson Hall; Raleigh, NC 27695-8109
phone: (919) 515-5864; fax: (919) 515-6268
e-mail: tom_vukina@ncsu.edu
Selected Paper
AAEA Annual Meeting: July 30 - August 2, 2000
Copyright  2000  by  Tsoulouhas  and  Vukina.  All  rights  reserved.    Readers  may  make
verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided
that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.1




Grower discontent with tournaments as  mechanisms  for settling  poultry  contracts  can
largely be attributed to the group composition risk that tournaments impose on growers.
This paper focuses on the welfare effects of a widely advocated regulatory proposal to
prevent integrator companies from using tournaments and replace them with schemes that
compare  performance  to  a  fixed  standard.    The  analysis  shows  that  whereas  the
mandatory  replacement of  tournaments  with  fixed  performance  standards,  absent  any
other  rules,  can  decrease  grower  income  insurance  without  raising  welfare,  replacing
tournaments  with  fixed  performance  standards  can  simultaneously  increase  income
insurance and welfare, provided that the piece rate is correctly specified.
1.  Introduction
In the last few decades the broiler industry has experienced tremendous growth
accompanied by technological progress and organizational  innovations.  The finishing
stage of broiler production (i.e., raising chicks to market weight) is now overwhelmingly
organized via contracts between companies, called integrators, and independent growers.
Judged by their prevalence, contracts have proven to be a successful mode of organizing
poultry production. Virtually all modern broiler contracts have a fairly similar payment
structure based on "two-part piece rate tournaments" consisting of a fixed base payment
per  pound  of  output,  and  a  variable  bonus  payment  based  on  the  grower’s  relative
performance.  Tournaments are used by almost all broiler companies and by a significant
number of turkey companies.
This paper focuses on the welfare effects of the regulatory proposal to ban relative
performance payment mechanisms (tournaments) in the settlement of poultry contracts
and replace them with "fixed performance standards."  These are schemes that compare
the individual performance of a grower to a predetermined standard rather than to the
average  performance  of  the  entire  group.    The  existing  literature  on  tournaments
emphasizes their role in reducing moral hazard and other contracting costs (Knoeber).  In
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fact, it has been shown that absent bankruptcy concerns, a two-part piece rate tournament
provides  a  linear  approximation  of  the  optimal  incentive  scheme  (Tsoulouhas  and
Vukina).  Despite their favorable properties, many broiler growers are dissatisfied with
the existing payment mechanisms.  Growers are opposed to a system that bases their
payments on how well or how poorly their  neighbors perform.  They also claim that
tournament outcomes can be  biased because the  initial quality and the distribution of
production inputs are exclusively under the control of the integrators.
Out of concern for such grower discontent, a number of states have considered
legislation to protect growers.  In Southern states such  legislative proposals generally
failed as integrators voiced strong opposition.  For example, in 1993, the North Carolina
Legislature introduced a bill that would have restricted the types of contracts that growers
and integrators could sign.  The bill specifically prohibited payments to a grower based
on his performance relative to other growers (Vukina).  Legislations with provisions that
protected the rights of growers to organize and create associations were also defeated in
Alabama  and  Louisiana.    However,  various  forms  of  legislation  aimed  at  regulating
contracts without explicitly targeting tournaments were passed in Minnesota, Wisconsin
and  Kansas  in  the  early  1990s  (Lewin).    On  the  Federal  level,  in  1997  a  regulatory
initiative  came  from  the  Grain  Inspection,  Packers  and  Stockyards  Administration
(GIPSA) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.   In  an  advanced  notice  of  proposed
rulemaking, the agency announced that it is considering "the need for issuing substantive
regulations to address concerns in the poultry industry with respect to contract payment
provisions tied to the performance of other growers" (Federal Register, p. 5935).  An
interesting  part  of  the  proposal  is  the  agency’s  opinion  "that  there  would  be  little
increased  burden  on  live  poultry  dealers  resulting  from  new  regulations  prohibiting
grower flock comparisons for settlement purposes" (ibid.).  Furthermore, in 1998, the
National Commission on Small Farms recommended that the Secretary of Agriculture
evaluate the need for Federal legislation to provide uniform contract regulations for all
growers engaged in agricultural production contracts.  In reference to poultry contracts,
the  recommendation  specifically  focused  on  the  factors  used  in  ranking  growers  and
determining performance payments.  No concrete regulatory actions have been taken so
far, but the pressure from the growers’ circles to do something continues.3
The objective of this paper is to shed light on the controversy surrounding the
widely advocated, yet poorly understood, proposal to regulate poultry contracts.  As seen
from  GIPSA’s  justification  of  the  need  for  government  intervention,  the  crux  of  the
growers’ complaints about tournaments is the problem of the group composition  risk.
"Under this system of determining grower payment, consecutive  flocks grown  by  the
same  grower  having  similar  production  costs  could  receive  substantially  different
payment  amounts  because  of  the  results  of  other  growers  in  the  settlement  group.
Growers have expressed exasperation over this form of settlement because they have no
way of estimating in advance how much to expect in payment." (Federal Register, p.
5935).  The essence of the contract settlement through tournaments is the elimination of
the common production uncertainty from the responsibility of the grower.  Because of
that, tournaments require that the calculation of the group average performance includes
growers whose flocks were harvested at approximately the same time, so that they are all
exposed to the same influence of common stochastic factors including weather, disease,
feed quality, genetic strains, etc.  Therefore, the group composition changes readily on a
flock by  flock  basis due to the unequal rotation  lengths of  flocks grown on different
farms, logistical considerations related to the transportation of feed and chicks, and the
management  of  production  volumes.    Mixing  growers  also  helps  to  avoid  consistent
contamination of a group by low ability growers, which would bias payments.  Thus,
given the integrator’s control of the group composition, a grower’s payments can vary
from one flock to the next even if all else is constant.
The alternative payment scheme that seems to be drawing considerable support
from the National Contract Poultry Growers Association and its state and local chapters,
as well as GIPSA, is the "fixed performance standard."  An obvious attraction to this
scheme is that it eliminates the group composition risk  because the performance of a
grower is no longer compared to the average performance of his peers, but rather to a
predetermined  technological  standard.    Another  reason  is  that  fixed  performance
standards have been successfully used for quite some time in the technologically similar
turkey industry.
The literature on the economic impact of integrator practices and procedures on
poultry growers, and consequently the need for government regulation of contracts, is4
minimal.  In a related paper Vukina and Foster assess how optimal input decisions by
growers change with the adoption of alternative contract designs.  The closely related
literature on franchising has generally been very critical of government regulation, on the
grounds that any regulation will interfere with the ability of economic parties to negotiate
efficient agreements (Beales and Muris; Brickley, Dark and Weisbach).  More recently,
critical of the  franchising  literature, Lewin argued that by  requiring  growers to  make
large specific investments in chicken houses, integrators can increase grower incentives
without  increasing  grower  compensation,  since  the  risk  of  losing  his  investment  will
increase a grower’s fear of low performance.  She concludes that because asset specificity
has such an effect on distribution, integrators have an incentive to insist on investments
that are unnecessarily specific.  Lewin is in favor of regulation to allow the unionization
of growers that would increase their bargaining status; she also favors the regulation of
contract duration.
Our goal in this paper  is to investigate whether the mandatory replacement of
tournaments with fixed performance standards would a) increase grower welfare, and b)
increase  or  decrease  the  social  surplus.    As  it  turns  out,  these  welfare  comparisons
critically depend on the relative magnitudes of two risks: the group composition risk and
the common production risk.  We rule out the possibility that the magnitude of group
composition risk exceeds that of common production risk, because in this case regulating
tournaments  in  favor  of  fixed  performance  schemes  would  produce  a  Pareto
improvement.    This  would  be  in  striking  contradiction  to  the  widespread  use  of
tournaments by poultry companies.  Instead we focus on the situation where common
production risk dominates group composition risk.  In this case, the analysis shows that
whereas the mandatory replacement of tournaments with fixed performance standards,
absent any other rules, can decrease grower income insurance without raising welfare,
income insurance and welfare can simultaneously be increased provided that the slope of
the bonus payment scheme, the so called "piece rate," is also regulated.  Moreover, the
enforcement of fixed performance standards absent any rules for the magnitude of the
piece  rate  will  result  in  an  unambiguous  reduction  in  social  surplus,  but  regulation
accompanied by a rule  determining  the  magnitude  of  the  piece  rate  may  or  may  not5
reduce social surplus, depending on the technology and preferences.  This is so because
integrator welfare is reduced, but grower welfare is increased.
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we describe the stylized
facts about contracting in the broiler industry, and present the model of broiler contracts
with tournaments as they are currently used by virtually the entire industry.  The results
obtained here will serve as a benchmark for the subsequent analysis of the regulatory
impact.    In  the  third  section  we  analyze  broiler  contracts  under  fixed  performance
standards and the impact of the proposed regulation on growers’ welfare and aggregate
social surplus.  In the final section we summarize the results and discuss their policy
implications.
2.  The contracts absent regulation
Virtually all broiler contracts have a very similar payment structure based on two-
part piece rate tournaments.  The compensation scheme consists of a fixed base payment
per pound of live meat produced, and a variable bonus payment based on the grower’s
relative performance.  The bonus payment is determined by comparing the  individual
grower’s performance to the group average.  The performance  is  measured  by  the  so
called "settlement cost" which  is obtained  by combining  feed  with  other  costs to the
integrator (chicks, medication, etc.) divided by the total pounds of live weight produced.
For a below average settlement cost (above average performance) the grower receives a
bonus,  while  for  an  above  average  settlement  cost  (below  average  performance)  he
receives  a  penalty.    The  calculation  of  the  group’s  average  performance  includes  all
growers whose flocks were harvested at approximately the same time (within a few of
weeks).  The total payment to grower i is given by:
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where  b denotes the “base payment” and b denotes the “piece rate.”  For  simplicity,
settlement  costs  have  been  approximated  by  the  simple  feed  conversion  ratio  x
i/y
i
(pounds of feed used to produce a pound of live weight broiler meat).
Based on the earlier work of Tsoulouhas and Vukina, we model the contractual
relationship between a single integrator and a number of growers.  We assume that each6
grower receives the same number of chicks that he is supposed to raise to the same target
weight.  Hence, the number of pounds produced is roughly the same for all growers and
the performance differs depending only on the feed used.  The amount of feed utilized by
a grower stochastically depends on his own effort.  By exerting effort, the grower can
speed up the growth of animals that will reach market weight by consuming less feed.
The integrator cannot directly observe the effort level of each grower, that is, there is
"hidden action" moral hazard.  The integrator can only observe the feed used and the
output  obtained  by  each  grower.    The  sequence  of  moves  is  as  follows.    First,  the
integrator offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to each grower that specifies a remuneration
schedule.   Second, the  growers  decide  whether  to  accept or reject the  offers.    If  the
growers accept the offers, then they exert effort and outcomes are realized and observed
by the integrator.  If they reject the offers, each party receives his reservation payoff.
The output target for each grower is set to  y .  Feed x
i used by grower i Î N =
{1,2,...,n} is in the  interval [xL,xH].  Let x º (x
1,¼,x
n) and x




denote the feed levels obtained by all growers including i and excluding i, respectively.
Effort e
i exerted by grower i takes one of two values {eL,eH} denoting  low and high







n) denote the efforts exerted by all
agents  including  i  and  excluding  i,  respectively.    The  integrator  does  not  offer  a
customized  contract  to  each  grower  because  gathering  information  about  individual
grower  characteristics  or  designing  and  implementing  contract  menus  is  prohibitively
costly.  Thus, ex ante, the principal treats all growers as identical in terms of the utility
function and the distributions of feed utilized.  In the presence of common shocks, the
distributions of feed are dependent.  Let c(x|e) denote the joint density  function of  x
given the actions of the growers, h(x
i|e) denote the marginal density obtained from c(x|e),
and  H(x
i|e)  denote  the  conditional  distribution  function.    The  density  h(x
i|e)  has  full
support, that is h(x
i|e)>0 for all e and all  x








i, with strict inequality for a set of values of x
i with positive probability, and
for every e
-i and i.  These are first-order stochastic dominance conditions saying that the
probability that the feed used by a grower exceeds any given level decreases with his
effort.  They imply that expected feed used by a grower is smaller when he chooses the7
high effort than the low effort:
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i is the grower’s remuneration and c(e
i) is his disutility of
effort.  The function U(×) is twice continuously differentiable, with U¢(×)>0, U¢¢(×)<0 (that
is, growers are risk-averse with respect to income).  The disutility of effort c(×) satisfies
c(eH)>c(eL)>0.  Thus, there is potential tension between the interests of the integrator and
those of the grower, because the high effort (which minimizes expected feed utilization)
is more costly to the grower than the low effort.  The principal is risk-neutral with respect
to  profit.   The  output  market  is  assumed  to  be  competitive,  the  price  of  output  p  is
deterministic and the price of feed is normalized to one.
An  optimal  contract  offered  to  grower  i  specifies  a  payment  r
i  depending  on
observed  feed  levels  x,  r
i(x).    It  is  useful  to  view  the  payment  to  an  agent  as  a
specification of contingent utility.  Let  u
i(x)ºU[r




i(x) denote equivalent income.  Since U(×) is increasing and strictly
concave,  U
-1  is  increasing  and  strictly  convex.  Following  the  Grossman  and  Hart
procedure, a scheme u
i(x) is said to implement effort level e
i if, given the scheme, effort
e
i provides agent i with at least his reservation utility and maximizes his expected utility.
An  incentive-efficient  scheme  for  effort  level  e
i  is  a  scheme  that  implements  e
i  at
minimum cost to the principal.  To derive the optimal utility payments, we characterize
the  incentive-efficient  scheme  assuming  that  the  principal  benefits  by  implementing
effort eH for the agents.  The incentive-efficient scheme u
i(x) solves the following convex
problem:
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where the constraints in (3) are individual rationality constraints, and those in (4) are
Nash incentive compatibility constraints.  Since from conditional probability we know
that c(x|×) = h(x
i|×) g(x
-i|x
i,×), it can be shown that the optimum incentive efficient scheme
satisfies:
(5) i,         x,    ,
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)   e = e , e = e , x | x g(   )   e = e , e = e | x h(
   -    1      +   
1





















where l and m are multipliers for constraints (3) and (4).
If the distributions of feed were independent, that is, if there were no common






-i would not be related to the effort choice of grower i given x
i).
Individual feed would be a sufficient statistic with respect to individual effort.  In this
case, the g(×) terms would cancel out, and r
i(×) would be independent of  x
-i.  However,
since the distributions of feed are dependent, individual feed utilization is not a sufficient
statistic for x
-i with respect to individual effort; the density g(x
-i½x
i, e
i) depends on e
i.
Hence, the feed levels obtained by the rest of the group convey an informative signal
about common production uncertainty and, as a result, the effort choice of any given
grower.    In  this  case,  condition  (5)  implies  that  the  optimum  compensation  rule  for
grower i must depend on the feed levels obtained by all growers.
The problem with this rule  is  that  it  cannot  be  easily  implemented  because  it
requires  the  precise  knowledge  of  distributional  forms.    However,  as  shown  by
Tsoulouhas and Vukina and Tsoulouhas, rule (5) can be considerably simplified without
harming incentives or the integrator’s profit.
1  If the number of growers is sufficiently
large, the average feed used by all growers except i, 
i x
- , can convey information about
the common production uncertainty, which suggests that the payment to each grower can
depend only on the feed he utilized and 
i x
- .  Given the output produced by all growers
except i, the optimum compensation rule for grower i can be approximated by a Taylor9
series expansion at x
i =
i x




(6) [ ] ) x ; (x ) U ( ) x ; r(x
i i 1 i i - - - ¢ = j ,
it follows that
(7) [ ] ( )[ ] ) x x )( x ; x ( ) x ; x ( ) U ( ) x ; x ( ) U ( ) x ; (x r
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where  [(U’)
-1]’  <  0  and  j’(×)>0.    The  approximation  in  (7)  is  a  two-part  piece-rate
tournament:
(8) ) x x ( b ) ( r
i i
0 0
i - + = ×
- ,
where a grower is paid a base payment b0 adjusted by a positive or negative amount that
depends  on  his  relative  performance ) x x (
i i -
- and  the  magnitude  of  the  “piece  rate”
0<b0<1.    The  base  payment  provides  incentives  to  growers  to  participate,  while  the
variable part provides incentives to exert effort.  Common uncertainty is removed from
the grower's responsibility.
3.  Alternative contracts under regulation
Consider now the compensation scheme based on the fixed performance standard:
r
i(x
i) = ba + ba(S - x
i), where S is a technological standard representing a feed conversion
ratio chosen ex ante.  A critical difference between a tournament and a fixed performance
standard  is  in the calculation  of  the  benchmark  against  which  the  performance  of  an
individual grower is compared.  Whereas in the first case the benchmark is determined by
a contest, in the second case it represents a predetermined standard.  As argued above,
tournaments provide insurance by filtering away common production uncertainty without
hurting  individual  incentives  to  perform.    Insurance  is  provided  by  removing  the
implications of common shocks from the responsibility of a grower, via linking grower
compensation  to  the  group  average  outcome.    Since  the  fixed  performance  standard
scheme  does  not  include  the  group  average  outcome,  insurance  against  common
uncertainty is generally reduced; growers are not fully insulated from common shocks.
Insurance can only be partially provided to the extent that the realized value of common
                                                                                                                                               
1 The simpler rule leads to savings in transaction costs by not requiring precise knowledge of all grower
characteristics.10
uncertainty happens to be close to the predetermined standard.  Yet, it is precisely the use
of  a  fixed  standard  that  insulates  the  growers  from  risk  emanating  from  the  group
composition.  Therefore, the welfare results of the two schemes critically depend on the
relative magnitude of two risks: the group composition risk and the common production
risk.  Not knowing a priori which one is larger, we have to analyze two possibilities: a)
group composition risk being larger than or equal to the common production risk; and b)
group composition risk being smaller than the common production risk.
2
In what follows we analyze the impact of the proposed regulation on growers’
welfare,  integrator’s expected profit and aggregate social  surplus.  For the  risk-averse
growers,  the  increase  in  welfare  can  come  about  via  the  increase  in  expected
compensation (payment) or via the reduction in the variability of payment (the increase in
insurance).  Of course, the risk neutral integrator cares only about the expected profit.  In
dealing with these issues, an important parameter is the de facto bargaining power of
integrators,  which  is  presumably  quite  large  in  the  absence  of  grower  unionization.
While the integrators are big companies operating on a national level, growers are mainly
farmers whose bargaining power is localized.  Integrators have the power to design and
propose  contracts that  are tailored  to  match  their  objectives  while  restraining  grower
rents.  Thus, even though regulation can increase the income insurance of growers by
eliminating the group composition risk,  it  does  not  immediately  follow  that  growers’
welfare  will  increase,  because  the  integrators'  bargaining  power  may  allow  them  to
extract all rents.
Notice  that  the  integrator’s  expected  profit  from  implementing  effort  levels
{eH}iÎN by offering the optimal incentive-efficient scheme {u
i(x)}iÎN is:
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Moving away from the optimal scheme to the alternative scheme may reduce expected
profit due to an increase in the feed costs  ò ×
i i i )dx h(x x n when the growers shirk (see
condition (2) which follows from first-order stochastic dominance).  However, it  may
                                                
2 Knoeber and Thurman estimated the magnitude of the common production risk in broiler contract
production at 3% of the growers’ payment variability, and equal to idiosyncratic risk, whereas an additional11
also  increase  expected  profit  when  the  integrator  lowers  the  growers’  compensation
ò ×
i i i i )dx )h(x (x r n by an insurance premium because better insurance is provided.  The
integrator's expected profit under the alternative scheme is:
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Thus, the change in expected profit can be separated into an incentive component














(i.e.,  a  change  in  expected  feed  costs  when  growers  change  their  effort)  and  into  an
insurance component
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(i.e., a change in expected compensation costs).  Observe that since the integrator will
aim at lowering expected grower compensation when he provides  better insurance, in
analyzing grower welfare and social surplus the  link  between grower income and his
coefficient  of  absolute  risk-aversion  -UNN(@)/UN(@)  may  be  important.    It  is  also
possible that the integrator may benefit by raising the growers’ expected compensation
(i.e., by charging a negative insurance premium) to compensate them for possible worse
insurance, or to provide them with incentives to perform (in which case the incentive
component is null because growers do not change their effort).
We start by  looking at the possibility that the group composition risk  may  be
larger than (or equal to) the common production risk.  From the growers’ perspective,
switching from a tournament to a fixed performance standard would eliminate the group
composition risk but would add the common production risk (which is smaller), hence the
overall insurance would go up.  Notice that this result holds even if the two risks are
precisely  equal  because  the  fixed  performance  standard  would  eliminate  some  of  the
common production uncertainty too, as long as the predetermined standard somewhat
approximates the actually obtained average feed conversion ratio.  The increase in total
                                                                                                                                               
6% is due to the combined effects of price and common production risks.  To the best of our knowledge,
the empirical estimation of the magnitude of the group composition risk has never been done.12
insurance should not reduce growers’ incentives to perform since the nature of the risk
that has been removed is not contingent on the growers' own actions. If the integrator
does not react, regulation will increase growers' welfare.  However, given the allocation
of bargaining power between the integrator and the growers, the integrator would lower
the expected payment to the growers by a risk premium.  Consequently, the regulation
should leave the growers' welfare unchanged.  In utility terms the increase in insurance
would be exactly offset by the reduction in expected payments.
From  the  integrator's  perspective,  the  incentive  component  is  zero  because
growers do not change their effort, and the insurance component is positive, hence, the
integrator's  welfare  (expected  profit)  would  increase.    Consequently,  regulating
tournaments  in  favor  of  fixed  performance  schemes  would  increase  social  surplus.
Moreover, it would constitute a Pareto improvement since the integrator's expected profit
would increase leaving the growers’ welfare unchanged.  The result, however, is strongly
refuted by the observed  industry practices.  If this situation were possible, all  broiler
companies currently using tournaments would have certainly abandoned them in favor of
the fixed performance standards.  The fact the we are still observing tournaments in a
great  majority  of  all  broiler  contracts  should  imply  only  that  the  magnitude  of  the
common production risk outweighs the magnitude of the group composition risk and that
the observed contracts are Pareto efficient.
The second situation presents a more interesting and complicated case.  If the
group  composition  risk  is  smaller  than  the  common  production  risk,  switching  from
tournaments to fixed performance schemes will eliminate the group composition risk but
will add the common production risk (which is larger), hence the overall insurance will
go  down.    Growers'  welfare  can  be  maintained  by  either  increasing  his  expected
compensation or by removing some of the idiosyncratic uncertainty from the growers'
responsibility.  However, if the alternative scheme increases total insurance by removing
some  of  the  uncertainty  that  is  contingent  on  a  grower's  own  actions  from  his
responsibility, then, it can reduce incentives to perform.  The remaining analysis shows
that  if  regulation  aiming  at  increasing  grower  insurance  simply  imposes  the  fixed
performance standard scheme without any specific rule for the piece rate, growers will
receive  worse  insurance  and  their  compensation  will  have  to  increase  via  a  negative13
insurance  premium,  but  with  no  overall  improvement  in  their  ex  ante  welfare.    The
insurance premium  is  negative  because the growers must be  paid  more  to  accept the
worse insurance.  From the  integrator’s perspective, the insurance component will  be
negative and the incentive component will be null.  The result may be summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition  1.    Under  regulation  mandating  the  settlement  of  contracts  via  a  fixed
performance standard scheme with no specific rules governing the magnitude of the piece
rate, the growers will receive worse insurance, larger expected payments and zero ex ante
rents, regardless of the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion, and the social surplus will be
unambiguously reduced.
Proof.  Absent any rules determining the magnitude of the piece rate, the integrator will
choose a ba which is sufficiently high to ensure that growers exert effort.  Since the fixed
performance standard scheme eliminates the group composition risk but adds common
production risk (which is assumed to be larger), the overall insurance will be reduced.
With a greater variation in payments, a grower's expected utility of income would drop
below his disutility of high effort if the expected payments ò ×
i i i i )dx )h(x (x r were equal
to the expected payments under the  optimal  scheme.    For  growers to  participate, the
integrator must increase the expected payments by a negative insurance premium (i.e.,
increase  ba)  without  providing  them  with  ex  ante  rents.    The  increase  in  expected
payments to the growers lowers the integrator expected profit, which in turn lowers the
social surplus.  The necessary increase in expected payments to growers is dependent
upon their coefficient of absolute risk-aversion.  In particular, it is larger if growers are
increasingly risk-averse than if they are decreasingly risk-averse. Q.E.D.
The presented result indicates that simple regulation mandating the use of fixed
performance  standards  will  not  achieve  the  objective  of  increasing  growers’  welfare.
Instead, to satisfy the constituency that demands the regulation of contracts, the regulator
will have to introduce a more elaborate scheme.  In particular, the analysis shows that the
piece  rate  will  have  to  be  lowered  to  provide  some  insurance  against  idiosyncratic14
uncertainty in situations where less insurance against common uncertainty is provided.
The  magnitude  of  the  piece  rate  is  crucial  because  this  is  where  the  implications  of
uncertainty come into play via the sensitivity of the scheme to outcomes.
Let zÎ[zL,zH] denote the variable payment obtained from ba(S-x




Given S and b0, the value of the piece rate ba should not exceed the largest b such that the
distribution  function  of  b(S-x
i)  second-order  stochastically  dominates  the  distribution
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with strict inequality for a set of values of z with positive probability.  The second-order
stochastic dominance condition ensures that growers bear less uncertainty overall under
the  fixed  performance  standard.    Therefore,  the  mandatory  use  of  fixed  performance
standards must be accompanied by a rule for determining the piece rate ba depending on
the  value  b0  currently  in  use,  namely,  ) ( 0 0
*
a £ £ .    Relevant  examples  for  the
determination of b
* are presented at the end of the section.
The remainder of the analysis shows that if a specific rule for the determination of
the  piece  rate  is  imposed,  the  grower  welfare  can  increase  along  with  the  mandated
improvement in the insurance provided.  This is so because an increase in insurance can
distort  grower  incentives  to  exert  effort.    The  growers  would  shirk  if  they  were  not
provided with ex ante rents, resulting in the insurance component being negative again.
In this case growers must be paid more so that they do not shirk, unlike in the first case
where they must be paid more to accept the worse insurance.  Further, the social surplus
may or may not be reduced, depending on the technology and preferences.  The results
are summarized in the second proposition.
Proposition  2.    Under  regulation  mandating  the  settlement  of  contracts  via  a  fixed
performance standard scheme augmented to include a special provision for the piece rate
requiring  that  ) ( 0 0
*
a £ £ ,  with  b
*(b0)  being  the  largest  b  satisfying  (13),  the
growers will receive better insurance and non-negative ex ante rents, regardless of the
coefficient of absolute risk-aversion, while the social surplus may or may not be reduced.15
Proof.  Since the agent will accept an offer only if his individual rationality constraint (3)
is  satisfied,  consider  the  following  cases  regarding  constraints  (3)  and  (4)  under  the
alternative scheme:
(i) (3) and (4) are non-binding;
(ii) (3) is non-binding and (4) is binding;
(iii) (3) is non-binding and (4) is violated;
(iv) (3) is binding and (4) is non-binding;
(v) (3) and (4) are binding;
(vi) (3) is binding and (4) is violated.
The third, the fourth and the  fifth case are  impossible.  In case  (iii),  if  the  incentive
constraint (4) is violated even when the grower receives rents, then there is no reason for
the integrator to provide any rents to the grower.  The integrator will cut his costs by
reducing the grower’s compensation in an amount equal to his risk-premium so that the
grower’s  rents  are  eliminated  and  his  individual  rationality  constraint  is  binding,  a
contradiction because the individual rationality constraint is assumed to be non-binding.
In  cases  (iv)  and  (v),  since  the  incentive  compatibility  constraints  are  satisfied,  the
growers will exert the high effort eH, hence, the expected feed cost will be identical to the
expected feed cost induced by the optimum scheme.  But if the expected feed cost is the
same,  since  the  alternative  scheme  is  not  optimal,  the  expected  compensation  to  the
grower must be higher than the one induced by the optimum scheme.  However, if the
expected compensation to the grower is higher and his income insurance is better, then,
his expected utility will  be  higher regardless of his absolute risk-version rate, that is,
expected utility payments will be in excess of the disutility of effort c(eH) and the agent
will receive ex ante rents, a contradiction because the individual rationality constraints
(3) are assumed to be binding in cases (iv) and (v).
Thus, the only possible cases are (i), (ii) and (vi).  Under the alternative scheme,
the grower either receives rents to exert effort as in cases (i) and (ii) or he shirks as in
case (vi).  Since integrators are allowed to choose among the fixed performance standard
schemes  satisfying  ) ( 0 0
*
a £ £ ,  the  former  case  occurs  if  the  integrator  finds  it
profitable, by comparing the insurance component to the incentive component, to offer16
the alternative scheme r
i(x
i) = ba + ba(S - x
i) with  ) ( 0 0
*
a £ < . The latter case occurs
when the integrator benefits by offering the alternative scheme with ba= 0.  This is so
because,  absent  the  incentive  compatibility  constraint,  the  optimum  scheme  provides
fixed payments to the grower regardless of outcome, that is, r
i(x




[xL,xH].  Growers always shirk if they receive flat payments, so that r
i(x
i) = ba =U
-1[c(eL)].
If the integrator offers r
i(x
i) = ba + ba(S - x
i), with  ) ( 0 0
*
a £ < , his feed costs
will  be  identical  to  the  feed  costs  induced  by  the  optimal  scheme  (the  incentive
component  is  null)  but  the  expected  compensation  costs  will  be  higher  since  the
alternative scheme is not optimal (the insurance component is negative since growers
must be paid more so that they will not shirk).  The increase in expected payments will
lower the integrator’s welfare, hence, the alternative contract does not constitute a Pareto
improving  move.  On the  other  hand,  the  grower  will  receive  rents  (i.e.,  his  ex  ante
welfare  will  increase)  because  his  expected  compensation  will  be  higher  and  his
insurance will be better.
3  However, social surplus may or may not decrease.  To see this,
observe that the change in social surplus is
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Given the grower’s risk-aversion, Jensen's inequality implies that the first term in square
brackets is negative and the second term is positive.  Hence, the social surplus may or
may  not  decrease  with  the  alternative  scheme  depending  on  the  technology  and
                                                
3 Note that while the grower would shirk if he received full insurance (i.e., ba= 0), the grower will not shirk
under the fixed performance standard scheme with 0<ba£ b*(b0), because insurance against common and
idiosyncratic uncertainty is not full (even though insurance against risk emanating from the group
composition is offered).  That is, the grower expects to receive higher rents by exerting effort.17
preferences.  Note that even though the social surplus may be higher under the proposed
alternative  scheme,  the  integrator  would  never  implement  it  without  government
regulation.  This is so because the integrator is worse off under this contract and the
grower is better off.  Further, the integrator could not transfer rents from the grower to
himself, because the grower would then shirk.
If the integrator offers r
i(x
i) = U
-1[c(eL)], then the grower will shirk and receive no
rents.  However, with this scheme the grower will receive full income insurance against
all uncertainties, because he will receive the same payment regardless of outcome.  Since
his expected utility of income will be reduced to c(eL) because he will shirk, while he
receives full income insurance, the expected payments he receives must be smaller than
the payments under the tournament regardless of his coefficient of absolute risk-aversion.
The social surplus may or may not decrease.  Q.E.D.
3.1. Regulation of the piece rate: numerical examples
In the remaining analysis we provide examples of stochastic  functions of  feed
utilization  to  suggest  a  course  for  empirically  investigating  the  rule  for  determining
b
*(b0), the maximum ba that regulation should allow.  The feed functions are motivated
by  the  output  functions  utilized  in  Lazear  and  Rosen,  Holmström,  and  Nalebuff  and
Stiglitz.  Let h denote the shock that is common to all growers and e
i denote the shock




i)), with µ>0.  We consider three cases:
(a) 1 e ; ) e ( x H
i
H
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(b) 1 e ); )( e ( x H
i
H
i < - + - =
(c) 0 e ; e x H
i
H
i < - < - + + - = .
In all cases by exerting effort the grower is expected to achieve a utilized  feed  level
below the one that is due to the common shock.  Assuming  ) x
￿
S
i - = ,
4 it follows that in
case (a)
                                                
4 Notice that integrators always have an incentive to use the most accurate prediction of average
performance for the value of the fixed standard S.  By doing so they can charge the maximum premium for
providing this type of insurance. Consequently, there is no need for regulating the magnitude of S as a part
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and in case (c)
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Note that in all cases the issue is to determine the maximum value of b, denoted
by b
*(b0), so that that b(S-x
i) stochastically dominates  ) x x (
i i
0 -
-  in the second-order
sense.    Conditions  (15)-(17)  indicate  that  all  distributions  have  the  same  zero  mean,
hence, the focus is on mean-preserving spreads.  Given that n/(n-1) converges to 1 for a
sufficiently  large  number  of  growers,  which  is  a  necessary  condition  for  using  a
tournament to begin with, it follows that  ) x x (
i i
0 -
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(19)
) V( + ) V(
) V(




in cases (b) and (c).  In all cases, b
*(b0)<b0.  For instance, if the variance of h is equal to
the variance of e
i, and assuming that b0=0.5 and (x-eH)=0.9, then b
*(b0)=0.37 in (18) and
b
*(b0)=0.35 in (19).
5  Note that the smaller the variance of h compared to the variance of
e
i, the closer b
* gets to b0, that is, the smaller the necessary reduction in the piece rate that
is  needed  to  ensure  that  growers  receive  at  least  as  much  insurance  as  before.    For
instance, if V(h)/V(e
i)=0.6, then, b
*(b0)=0.41 in (18) and b
*(b0)=0.40 in (19).
                                                
5 Knoeber and Thurman have estimated that common production uncertainty and growers’ idiosyncratic
uncertainty are equal.  The piece rate of 0.5 is actually used by many integrators.19
4.  Conclusions
Many  poultry  contract  growers  are  dissatisfied  with  the  existing  contractual
arrangements.  Their complaints focus primarily on tournament schemes, under which
growers receive a fixed amount per pound of live meat produced plus a bonus payment
for  using  integrator-provided  inputs  efficiently.  Poultry  growers  have  repeatedly
expressed concern about tournaments because they believe that it is unfair to compare
their production costs with those of other growers in determining payments.  Consecutive
flocks  grown  by  the  same  grower,  and  having  similar  production  costs,  can  receive
substantially different payments depending on the performance of other growers in the
settlement group.  Growers have expressed exasperation over this form of remuneration
since they have no way of anticipating how large their payments will be.  In essence, they
argue that current contractual arrangements ignore the implications of group composition
risk.  In addition, growers have also raised complaints about the quality of chicks, the
way  that  live  birds  and  feed  are  weighed,  and  the  length  of  time  between  flock
placements.    They  also  complain  about  contract  non-renewal,  contract  terminations,
requirements that facilities be modified or upgraded (excessively), their limited choice of
integrators or their inability to change integrators, and about alleged integrator reprisals
for joining grower associations and for seeking redress of grievances.
Out of concern for such grower discontent, a number of states and the Federal
Government have considered legislation to protect growers through the regulation of the
various aspects of broiler contracts.  This paper deals with a widely advocated regulatory
proposal to ban tournaments as a means of settling contracts and replace them with fixed
performance standards.  Although it has not been explicitly said, the implicit objective of
the  proposed  regulation  is  to  increase  the  growers’  welfare  either  through  increased
insurance or through the increase in expected payments or both.  Our objective in this
paper  was  to  analyze  the  impact  of  replacing  tournaments  with  fixed  performance
standards on the magnitude of the social surplus in general and on the growers' welfare in
particular.    The  presented  results  are  the  first  step  towards  a  systematic  analysis  of
welfare implications of the proposed regulation of poultry contracts.  If public policy in
this area is to receive sufficient guidance, it is essential that more research be conducted
on the economic impact of integrator practices and procedures on poultry growers.20
The obtained results can be summarized as follows.  Regardless of the growers’
absolute risk-aversion, the enforcement of fixed performance standards absent any rules
for the determination of the piece rate can in fact result in less insurance without any
improvement in the ex ante grower welfare.   If  regulation  aims  at  increasing  grower
income insurance, the enforcement of fixed performance standards must be accompanied
by  rules  determining  the  magnitude  of  the  piece  rate.    In  both  cases,  the  expected
payments to the growers can increase.  Without any rules specifying the magnitude of the
piece rate, expected payments must increase so that the growers will accept the worse
insurance.  With rules regulating the magnitude of the piece rate, expected payments and
welfare can increase so that the growers will not shirk when they receive better insurance.
The enforcement of fixed performance standards absent any rules for the magnitude of
the  piece  rate  will  result  in  an  unambiguous  reduction  in  social  surplus,  because
integrator surplus is reduced and grower surplus is unchanged.  The enforcement of fixed
performance standards accompanied by rules determining the magnitude of the piece rate
may or may  not reduce social  surplus, depending on the technology  and  preferences.
This is so because grower welfare increases, while integrator welfare decreases, so that
the  result  does  not  constitute  a  Pareto  improvement.    To  conclude,  even  though  the
enforcement of  fixed  performance  standards  with  rules  about the  piece  rate  does  not
induce a Pareto superior move, and  it  may reduce social  surplus,  it can  raise  grower
welfare.    Policy  aiming  at  improving  the  welfare  of  growers  must  enforce  fixed
performance standards via regulation.    The  integrator  companies  would  never  initiate
such  a  move  by  themselves,  because  they  are  worse  off  under  this  scheme.    Fixed
performance standards redistribute the welfare in favor of the growers.
Obviously there are many other important facets of broiler contracts that were not
addressed in this paper.  In addition to the issue of regulating the payment schemes, the
need for government intervention in private contracts may or may  not be  justified on
some  other  grounds.  One  of  the  more  interesting  issues  is  the  problem  of  regional
competition on the market for growers, and the related problem of a potential "hold-up."
It  is  certainly  conceivable  that,  by  making  growers  incur  large  specific  investments,
integrators can increase grower incentives without increasing grower compensation, since
the  risk  of  losing  his  investment  will  increase  a  grower’s  fear  of  low  performance.21
Because asset specificity has such an effect on distribution, integrators have an incentive
to insist on investments that are unnecessarily specific.  Thus, especially in geographical
regions where the integrator enjoys market power, grower complaints about excessive
investments may be theoretically justified.
A closely related issue is the question of termination and the associated grower
demand  to  regulate  contract  length.    Since  growers  must  make  relationship-specific
investments, they can become vulnerable to opportunistic behavior once the investment is
sunk.  However, serious doubt can be cast on the enforceability of regulating contract
length,  and  more  importantly,  efficiency  can  be  hindered  if  integrators  are  unable  to
terminate their relationships with unproductive growers.  If the integrator knows that he
may be facing a "featherbedding" problem, he may be reluctant to initiate a contractual
relationship  in  the  first  place.    Integrator  opportunism  is  not  a  common  occurrence
anyway.  We believe that grower provision of investments provides an efficient way for
integrators to finance expansion, with a positive employment feedback to the growers.
Productive growers typically enjoy a long-term relationship with an integrator.  Grower
provision of capital is the fee for entering a long-term relationship with an integrator, and
an  important  device  for  screening  out  low  ability  growers.    Relationship-specific
investments  have  the  added  benefit  of  enhancing  an  integrator’s  ability  to  provide
insurance to risk-averse growers by reducing grower opportunism.22
References
BEALES, J.H. III AND T. J. MURIS, "The Foundations of Franchise Regulation: Issues
and Evidence,"  Journal of Corporate Finance 2 (1995), 157-97.
BRICKLEY, J. A., F. H. DARK AND M. S. WEISBACH, "The Economic Effects of
Franchise Termination Laws,"  Journal of Law And Economics 33 (1991), 101-32.
FEDERAL  REGISTER,  Grain  Inspection,  Packers  and  Stockyards  Administration,
"Regulations Issued Under The Packers And Stockyards Act: Poultry Grower Contracts,
Scales, Weighing," 9 CFR Part 201, 62(27), (February 10, 1997).
GROSSMAN,  S.J.  AND  O.  HART,  An  Analysis  of  the  Principal-agent  Problem,
Econometrica 51 (1983), 7-45.
HOLMSTRÖM, B., "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell J. of Economics 13 (1982), 324-340.
KNOEBER,  C.R.,  "A  Real  Game  of  Chicken:  Contracts,  Tournaments,  and  the
Production of Broilers," Journal of Law Economics and Organization 5 (1989), 271-292.
KNOEBER, C.R. AND W.N. THURMAN, ""Don't Count Your Chickens...": Risk and
Risk Shifting in the Broiler Industry," Am. J. of Agricultural Econ. 77 (1995), 486-496.
LAZEAR,  E.P.  AND  S.  ROSEN,  "Rank-Order  Tournaments  as  Optimum  Labor
Contracts," Journal of Political Economy 89 (1981), 841-864.
LEWIN, S. B., "Asset Specificity and Hold-Up in Franchising and Grower Contracts: A
Theoretical  Rationale  for  Government  Regulation?"  Working  Paper,  Iowa  State
University (1998).
NALEBUFF,  B.J.  AND  J.E.  STIGLITZ,  "Prizes  and  Incentives,"  Bell  Journal  of
Economics 14 (1983), 21-43.
TSOULOUHAS, T. AND  T.  VUKINA,  "Integrator  Contracts  with  Many  Agents  and
Bankruptcy," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81(1) (1999), 61-74.
TSOULOUHAS, T., "Do Tournaments Solve the Two-sided Moral Hazard Problem?"
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 40 (1999), 275-294.
VUKINA, T.,  "Broiler Contracts: Should They Be Regulated?" Commentary, Broiler
Industry, (October 1997), 32-34.
VUKINA, T. AND  W.E. FOSTER, "Grower Response To Broiler Production Contract
Design."  In J.S. Royer and R. Rogers, Eds., The Industrialization of Agriculture: Vertical
Coordination in the U.S. Food System.  Ashgate Publ., Aldershot, U.K., 1998, 133-154.